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ABSTRACT 
Using  the  example  of  conflict  escalation  in  former  Yugoslavia,  a  common  framework  of  the 
mechanisms leading to conflict escalation is developed in this paper. Escalation of ethno-nationalist 
violence is described as an endogenous feature of the nation. The principle of the nation may succeed 
in  being  an  organising  principle  for  integrating  large-scale  social  groups.  However,  it  may  also 
generate the extreme event of ethno-nationalist violence. The architecture of a simulation model is 
described to test the extreme event hypothesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, a war broke out in the midst of Europe: unlike the peaceful secession of 
Czechoslovakia, for instance, which occurred at around the same time, the breakdown of 
Yugoslavia was extremely violent. It was the first time the phenomenon of war had occurred 
in Europe since World War II. What is more, the series of wars went hand in hand with 
serious crimes that captured the attention of the world community. It is tempting to state that 
a  number  of  these  crimes  were  of  a  rather  different  nature  to  war  crimes  committed  in 
conventional interstate wars. While conventional wars are characterised by the order and 
command structure of the armed forces (although it might have been questioned inasmuch, 
people took advantage of it), the Yugoslavian case provided a paradigm for so-called „new 
wars‟ [1]: in fact, most attempts to recruit Serbian people to serve in the army to fight these 
wars failed. Desertion was more the rule than the exception [2]. On the other hand, actions 
and – in particular, crimes – were undertaken by citizens who were not part of any organised 
armed forces
1
. People chose voluntarily (and not by command) to commit crimes in the name 
of the nation. In the process, the events in Yugoslavia changed the dominant perspective on 
security  issues.  While  the  Cold  War  era  was  dominated  by  a  focus  on  state  issues,  the 
Yugoslavian  case  changed  the  perspective  from  the  state  to  society  [3].  While  not 
uncontested [4, 5], this went along with a new awareness of a seemingly increasing number 
of ethnic conflicts [6-9]. Thus, these wars provide a new perspective on the old question of 
why people should die (and murder) for an obviously symbolic construct such as the nation. 
The fact that these wars now lie roughly 20 years in the past may give us the opportunity to 
reconsider  them  from  a  more  distant  perspective.  Since  the  wars  have  already  been  the 
subject of numerous detailed scientific investigations, no completely new or different facts 
and causes are expected to be uncovered. Yet it remains controversial whether Yugoslavia 
should not have been an impossibility in the first place (the „ancient hatred‟ hypothesis) [10] 
or  whether it was a  victim of Machiavellian politics  (the „manipulation‟  hypothesis) [2]. 
However, historical explanations typically focus on the question of why and how a particular 
event (in this case: the wars) were realised. This overlooks that peace is also an event that is 
in need of an explanation [11-13]. It is a different question to ask: Why was Yugoslavia 
possible in the first place? In fact, until the 1980s it was the most developed south-east 
European country and one of the first candidates to join the European Union. The purpose of 
this  article is  to  provide  a  joint framework to  explain peace  and conflict by considering 
crimes in the name of a nation (or an ethnic group) as an extreme event of a self-organised 
process. We shall follow the perspective pioneered by [14] to apply the theory of self-organised 
criticality [15] to security issues. While [14] focused on interstate war, this approach will be 
extended here to ethno-nationalist secession and civil wars. It is well-known that nationalism 
and racism have been the cause of numerous massacres. Nevertheless, compared to ordinary 
times, ethnic massacres are rare events. By the 19
th century at the latest, the nation-state had 
become the dominant mode of the organisation of political regimes. Numerous nation-states 
exist quite peacefully. This means that exogenous causes should not be sought
2, but that such 
events should be regarded as an endogenous feature of the system. It will thus be asked how 
„ethnic‟ conflicts may – or may not – arise from the particular organisation of political regimes, 
known as nation-states. This leads to the hypothesis that the very same structures that generate 
social order (by the principles of the nation) can also generate anomic social conflicts. 
The paper will elaborate this hypothesis in the following manner: firstly, a brief overview of 
the explanations found in the literature will be given. Secondly, a brief outline of the theory of 
the nation-state will be provided. Here terminology will be introduced to enable, thirdly, the 
case in question to be integrated into the framework of extreme event statistics. Moreover, in M. Neumann 
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this third section it will be argued that the statistical investigation is in need of a simulation 
approach to define a basic population, and the motivation behind the modelling concept will 
be given. Fourthly, the model architecture will be outlined. The paper finally concludes with 
an outlook on general insights. 
TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
In the following, we will give a brief sketch of the events leading to the initial phase of the 
conflict escalation until ethnic homogenisation took place for the first time. An overview of 
the explanations will then be given. 
THE CONFLICT ESCALATION 
The constitution of 1974 described Yugoslavia as a multi-national federal republic, consisting 
of  six  republics.  Each  republic  comprised  one  of  Yugoslavia‟s  constituent  nations.  The 
territories of the republics were drawn along historically established borderlines. This goes 
back to the history of the founding of the first Yugoslavian state after World War I. During 
the wars in the 1990s, Yugoslavia collapsed along these borderlines. In the following, a brief 
overview of the escalation process will  be given up to when the point of no return was 
reached. Subsequently, a brief classification of the core explanations in the literature will be 
outlined [16, 17]. 
Soon after Tito‟s death in 1980, rumblings could be heard in Kosovo in 1981 [18, 19] that 
went hand in hand with ethnic tensions between the Albanian and Serbian inhabitants of the 
region. After Tito‟s death, nationalist movements emerged in the political landscape. The 
beginning  of  the  conflict  was  triggered  by  a  power  struggle  within  the  Yugoslavian 
Communist Party about Tito‟s legacy. Formerly, communist politicians took advantage of 
ethnic sentiments, allowing them to organise loyalty with an ethnic agenda. In particular, 
Milosevic‟s  rise  to  power  is  well  documented  [20].  Essential  elements  of  his  strategy 
provoked  nationalist  prejudices  and  attempts  to  establish  Serbian  dominance  among  the 
federal republics. Particularly well known is the speech he delivered in April 1987 in Kosovo 
Polje  when  he  promised  the  local  Serbs  that  „no  one  should  beat  you‟.  He  was  able  to 
stimulate  mass  movements  in  Montenegro  and  the  Vojvodina,  bringing  liegemen  of 
Milosevic into power [21]. The power struggles at the end of the 1980s still took place within 
the Yugoslavian Communist Party, culminating in a congress of the Communist Party on 22 
January  1990.  Yet  the  first  free  elections  in  the  individual  republics  brought  nationalist 
parties into power, albeit often with only marginal majorities. In April 1990, Franjo Tudjman 
won the first free elections in Croatia
3. This created a situation in which Yugoslavia had been 
described  as  a  hot  iron  between  Tudjman  and  Milosevic  as  hammer  and  anvil  [22]. 
Nevertheless, the degree of ethnic mobilisation in the population was rather small. Even in 
1990, the results of opinion polls in Bosnia revealed that more than 90 % considered ethnic 
relations in their neighbourhood to be good, even though there were already political tensions 
at the political level [23]. 
However, very soon civilians were also becoming involved in the battles and, in particular, in 
war  crimes.  The  violence  was  not  accidental,  but  aimed  at  establishing  ethnically 
homogeneous nations out of the former multi-ethnic country of Yugoslavia. The violence of 
the militia was motivated by an awareness of ethnic identity. The escalation of tensions into 
open conflict started after Croatia declared its independence in 1991. The Krajina region in 
south-west Croatia was inhabited by a majority of Serbians. As a reaction to the Croatian 
independence, the establishment of a Serbian autonomous province of Krajina was declared 
on 28 February 1991, provoking armed conflicts
4. A new stage of conflict escalation set in, Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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resulting from conflicting loyalties and territorial claims. A further stage was reached on 
26/27 August 1991, when the first ethnic homogenisations took place in the small village of 
Kijevo,  inhabited  mainly  by  Croatians  [19].  After  the  village  had  been  attacked  by  the 
Yugoslavian  Army,  a  paramilitary  militia  of  the  Krajina  Serbs  invaded  the  village  and 
displaced the Croatian population, destroying their houses. The militia consisted of the local 
Krajina  Serbs,  civilians  who  were  not  integrated  into  the  command  structure  of  the 
Yugoslavian army. As characteristic for the militia‟s course of action, they prewarned the 
Serbian inhabitants of the village, who chose not to pass on the information to their Croatian 
neighbours. This modus operandi turned out to be a template for later ethnic homogenisations 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina [19]. 
At this point, a stage was reached in which civilians were mobilised for the war and even to 
actively participate in war crimes. Presumably, a point of no return had been reached when 
social order disintegrated into an anomic state. The puzzling question is how people became 
attuned to commit such crimes. 
TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
This was a very brief description of the early phase of the Yugoslavian wars. Several explanations 
for the wars can be found in the literature. These explanations can essentially be differentiated 
into two accounts: one line of reasoning aims to identify the conditions that led to conflict; 
the other class of investigations concentrates on analysing the mechanisms of the conflicts. 
Conditions 
Explanations that investigate the conditions that led to conflict can be differentiated into 
whether they focus on international or internal conditions. 
International situation. One condition that can be identified is the international situation [24, 25]. 
At the end of the Cold War, international relations were in a phase of destabilisation. For 
example,  some  authors  stress  that  the  early  acceptance  of  Slovenia  and  Croatia  by  the 
European  Union,  particularly  enforced  by  Germany,  yet  without  possessing  regulatory 
powers when the war escalated, was partially responsible for the escalation [26]. The unclear 
and too weak mandate of UN soldiers is another example. Although these factors can explain 
the possibility of the escalation, they cannot explain why it took place in the first place. This 
line of reasoning provides a prime example of explaining violent crises by „external shocks‟. 
The radical change of the international situation provides a condition beyond the influence of 
the state that has to face its consequences. 
Internal (economic) situation. We therefore have to explore the internal conditions of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Classical political economy calls for an investigation of the 
economic situation. In fact, Yugoslavia underwent a serious economic crisis in the 1980s [27]. 
From the mid 1980s, Yugoslavia suffered from declining production volumes. Likewise, the 
republic had to face a dramatic increase in the inflation rate. In 1989, there was even a 
hyperinflation of 2700 %. Together with the stagnation of wages, this caused a dramatic 
decrease in the standard of living. Moreover, the combination of these factors resulted in a 
dramatic increase in state debt. In other words, political collapse went hand in hand with 
economic collapse. 
A comparable line of reasoning is also emphasised by accounts that question the concept of 
ethnic wars [5]. These accounts argue that ethnicity is not the decisive condition for conflict 
escalation.  Nevertheless,  the  question  remains  why  the  conflicts  escalated  along  national 
borderlines. Insofar as the economic situation may cause grievance, it can provide conditions 
for an increase in the likelihood of violence. In psychological terms, a variation of living M. Neumann 
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conditions, in particular if this change is very rapid, is an example of an external treatment. It 
may induce several actions in individuals facing this treatment, ranging from deprivation to 
violence. However, this cannot explain why the violence took place along national borderlines
5. 
Both  the  international  situation  and  economic  performance  provide  conditions  for  an 
increasing likelihood of violence
6. However, they do not identify mechanisms that generate 
specific violent actions. 
Mechanisms 
At the level of explanatory accounts focusing on mechanisms, again two dimensions can be 
differentiated: those that focus on a political level and those that explore the matter on a cultural 
level. 
Political level. The first and obvious answer is the recourse to voluntary action of political 
actors.  A  description  of  political  events  provides  empirical  material  for  an  analysis  of  the 
political agenda and strategies of the political actors involved [2, 18]. There can be no doubt 
that in the  1980s and  early 1990s  actors  from the centre  of the political élite consciously 
escalated  the  crisis  of  the  Federal  Republic  to  reinforce  their  personal  political  power.  A 
considerable part of the political élite gained personal advantage from the political collapse of 
the  Federal  Republic  [21].  Again,  these  accounts  emphasise  the  effects  certain  actions  by 
politicians have on certain political systems. In this respect, this explanatory account can be 
compared  to  changing  (economic)  living  conditions:  replacing  peaceful  politicians  by 
irresponsible political entrepreneurs can also be regarded as an external shock. However, this 
account does not answer the question why Yugoslavia was possible in the first place. We must 
ask why nationalist politicians became successful at a particular point of history. 
Cultural level. This question is addressed by recourse to Balkan history, which has become a 
prominent mode of explanation. This approach emphasises the culturally entrenched „ancient 
hatred‟ of the Balkan peoples as the driving force behind the conflict escalation. Wars in the 
very  early  history  of  the  region,  such  as  the  battle  at  Kosovo  Polje  [29,  30],  served  as  a 
demonstration of the impossibility of Yugoslavia becoming a nation-state. It is claimed that an 
explanation has to take into account cultural ties and frontiers. In fact, conflicts crystallised 
along the borderlines of the different religions [31] and different languages [32] within the 
Federal Republic. This explanation has become prominent in both journalistic and scientific 
discourse  [10,  33].  However,  this  explanation  is  intimately  related  to  the  ideological  self-
justification of the political actors  and  does not answer the question  why these ideologies 
became successful at a particular point in history. Recourse to cultural legacy is indeed an 
endogenous explanation but leaves open the question of how and why Yugoslavia became 
possible in the first place. 
In the following, the hypothesis will be elaborated that any comprehension of the mechanisms 
has to take the political and the cultural dimensions into account. On the one hand, generating 
politicians is an endogenous feature of any political system. This refers to a kind of political 
dimension.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  explain  why  violence  took  place  along  national 
borderlines and why ethnic homogenisation was a goal in the first place. This refers to some 
kind  of  cultural  dimension.  This  does  not  imply  that  Yugoslavia  was  not  an  impossible 
construct, but that the relation between the political and the cultural dimension can be described 
as a recursive process. This was already suggested by the brief sketch of the early phase of the 
escalation dynamics in which both politicians and civilians were involved. On this basis, the 
escalation of violence appears as an extreme event of recursive dynamics. However, to develop 
this hypothesis more precisely, terminology has to be elaborated that shall be derived from the 
theory of the nation-state. Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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THEORY OF THE NATION-STATE 
While it remains controversial whether ethnic awareness is an ancient phenomenon
7, it is 
widely acknowledged that nation-states are a modern invention [34, 35]. By the 19
th century at 
the latest, the nation-state had become the dominant mode of the organisation of political regimes. 
Even though the process of globalisation now undermines the foundations of nation-states, no 
alternative mode of the organisation of political regimes is currently in sight. Nonetheless, 
appeals  to  national  identities  are  able  to  evoke  sentiments  that  can  elicit  –  sometimes 
dramatically cruel – action. 
In the 1980s, the theory of the state became dominated by constructivist approaches [34-38]. 
A brief sketch of the constitutive elements of this theoretical account enables us to identify 
central elements of the mechanisms of the operational principles of modern nation-states. 
Following this  framework,  two dimensions  will be  distinguished  below:  a  cultural  and  a 
political dimension [39]. 
THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE NATION 
The cultural dimension of the nation-state can be characterised as providing a form of social 
integration. In feudal times, kingdoms were established by „the grace of god‟. Religion not 
only  provided  ruling  authorities  with  legitimacy,  but  also  organised  social  cohesion  by 
ideological ties and elements of social service. Following Nietzsche‟s famous phrase „god is 
dead‟,  this  mode  of  integrating  large  social  groups  collapsed  in  the  19
th  century.  In  this 
respect, the nation-state evolved as a functional equivalent
8. National states established a 
particular form of what was termed „imagined communities‟ [34]. The characteristic of these 
communities  is  a  sense  of  belonging  to  the  nation  as  a  kind  of  group.  This  refers  to 
psychological  principles.  Such  a  community  is  constructed  using  the  example  of  small 
groups,  however,  extending  this  idea  to  large  social  groups.  The  nation  is  regarded 
qualitatively as the union of a certain „ethnic group‟, not merely as the sum of the people 
inhabiting  a  certain  territory.  It  is  therefore  called  a  „community‟.  Since  it  is  actually 
impossible  to  know  all  of  the  national  group  members  personally,  Anderson  talks  of 
„imagined‟ communities. However, the idea of a national community calls on the nation-state 
to provide some kind of security for the vagaries of life. State duties and responsibilities 
range from policing to aging and health care. A prominent example from the 20
th century is 
the welfare state. 
However, the nation also has an emotional dimension. The idea of a nation typically goes 
hand in hand with some kind of myths surrounding its origin [37, 40]. The mechanisms to 
construct the imagination of a community with unknown strangers are described by cultural 
sociology as symbolic constructs, such as monuments, flags, etc. [41]. The construction of 
national monuments enables tradition to be invented [37]. During the 19
th century, historical 
monuments where erected all over Europe for national heroes of ancient times, describing 
these individuals as founders of the respective nation. Such culturally entrenched symbols 
provide narratives for which people are ready to live and die for [41], providing culturally 
shared patterns to interpret and evaluate the world. Hence, the ruling system of the nation-state 
is associated with a form of identity. While the relation between the political élite and a 
nation-state‟s  citizens is  typically mediated  by  the administrative  apparatus,  an  appeal  to 
symbolic identities can enable direct mass-mobilisation. Identities can stimulate action that is 
not in the direct self-interest of the individual. This became apparent in the violence in former 
Yugoslavia.  However,  the  nationalist  ruling  system  is  also  a  form  of  organising  social 
cohesion,  including  material  and  ideological  dimensions.  In  this  respect,  the  myth  of  a 
national community is a functional equivalent to religious communities. M. Neumann 
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In principle, the cultural dimension becomes effective by framing individual cognitive and 
emotional dispositions in a commonly shared manner. „Ancient hatred‟ has to be activated as 
a  motivational  force  for  an  action  by  a  specific  individual  who  believes  this  semantic 
category  to  be  true.  Both  actions  and  emotions  (as  a  motivational  force  for  actions)  are 
features  of individuals.  However,  the  cultural  construction  of  the  semantic  category  of  a 
nation was a historical process. This framework enables the cultural dimension of the nation 
to be integrated into the framework of social psychology [42-44], in particular, the social 
identity approach [45, 46]. The national identity can be described as a form of social identity. 
Social Identity is a psychological mechanism that not only generates solidarity, but that also 
provides culturally shared patterns to interpret the world by providing categorisations [45]. 
Categorisations  generate  a  semantically  structured  environment,  including  the  social 
environment. For instance, an individual might be characterised as a male Australian surfer [45]. 
This description includes the categories male, Australian and surfer. Only such culturally 
constructed semantic categories enable us to distinguish between Serbs and Croats, for instance. 
THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF THE NATION 
By contrast, the political dimension of the nation can be characterised as providing legitimacy 
for the ruling authority [47]. Max Weber defined power as the chance that an individual can 
get his point across in a social relationship even against resistance, regardless of what the 
chance is based on [48]. However, if political power is not built purely on coercion, some 
kind  of  motivation  has  to  be  provided  for  the  individual  to  obey  the  ruling  authority. 
Compared  to  pure  coercion,  legitimate  power  has  the  advantage  of  reducing  the  costs 
required to establish power. Consider again the example that kingdoms were established by 
„the grace of god‟ in feudal times. Thus religion was not only an instrument to organise social 
cohesion, but also to legitimise political power. The French Revolution may serve as a prime 
example that this kind of legitimisation has lost its persuasive power [35, 49]. Again, the idea 
of a nation provides an alternative: in modern times, god is replaced by the sovereignty of the 
people as the legitimate source of political power. Various versions of this principle have 
been formulated: beginning with Thomas Hobbes, a number of theories have been formulated 
based  on  the  idea  of  a  social  contract.  Later,  this  was  often  associated  with  democracy. 
Again, the French Revolution is the prime example. Yet, the principle of the sovereignty of 
the people need not be democratic. Neither Hobbes nor later Carl Schmitt [50], for instance, 
were democrats. However, the example of Carl Schmitt illustrates the role of the nation in the 
framework of the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Namely, the question has to be 
asked: Who are the people? It is now very easy to identify the people with the nation. The 
nation therefore provides a source to legitimate political power. 
However, in contrast to the idea of a world community, a nation does not include all members 
of the human species. This refers to the fact that the nation has been described not only as an 
imagined  but  also  as  a  circumscribed  community  [34].  The  formation  of  national  states 
established borderlines between the states that are not completely arbitrary (even though there 
were considerable changes), as was the case with feudal states. The national state is regarded 
as the state of a constituent nation. Such a nation, however, is restricted in space. Historical 
investigations have distinguished two modes of the formation of nation-states: a state-to-
nation and a nation-to-state principle of nation building [51]. These modes have also been 
termed the western and eastern mode, which can be differentiated along the principles of 
citizenship law. The state-to-nation principle refers to the ius soli principle that individuals 
residing within the borderlines of the state territory are the citizens of a state. Historically, 
Western European countries such as Spain or France already established a certain territory in 
feudal times, and the nation was „born‟ within this territory. This is the „western mode‟ of Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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state  building.  In  East  Europe,  however,  no  such  homogeneous  state  territories  were 
established (at least: not everywhere) prior to the emergence of the nation. On the one hand, 
the  emergence  of  the  idea  of  a  German  nation  blew  up  the  borderlines  of  pre-existing 
territorial states. On the other hand, in the feudal empires of the Austrian monarchy and the 
Ottoman Empire, nations were „born‟ within the larger empires. This mode of state building 
implies that a nation might exceed the borderlines of a certain territory; it can also imply that 
a state may include mixed nations [51, 52], an example of which is former Yugoslavia. This 
is  the  „eastern  mode‟  of  state  building,  associated  with  the  ius  sanguinis  principle  that 
citizenship is based on a birth principle. The semantic category of a nation therefore provides 
a means for inclusion and exclusion. 
SECURIZITATION OF THE NATION 
To sum up, the idea of a nation can generate social integration by providing a socio-cultural 
identity at a cultural level and a specific form of legitimacy for power built on this very 
socio-cultural identity at a political level. However, the very same principle can also develop a 
highly critical potential by providing mechanisms leading to the emergence of ethno-nationalist 
violence. This can be analysed in the framework of the theory of securitization [53]. The 
theory of securitization addresses the question of how security issues arise on a political 
agenda. Securitization is described as a speech act that declares an object of communication 
as  being  under threat
9. For  instance,  the  slogan  „save  the  whales‟  can  be  described  as  a 
securitization act. Successful securitization can then generate the perception of an emergency 
situation,  calling  for  rapid,  urgent  reaction.  This  legitimises  extreme  means  outside  the 
normal order of the normative structure of society. The central components of successful 
securitization are “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by 
breaking free of rules” [3; p.514]. Securitization therefore also provides perceived competence 
– and thus legitimate power – for those political entrepreneurs who successfully communicate 
the aversion of the threat. These are typically the very same people who claim the existence 
of a security challenge in the first place. In principle, anything can become an object of 
securitization. However, it is essential that the speech act succeeds in convincing the audience. 
At this point, it is important for the nation to be an emotionally entrenched cultural categorisation. 
This improves the chance of the successful communication that the imagined community of a 
nation is indeed under threat. In contrast to state security, which threatens the sovereignty of 
the state, societal security [3] addresses the issue of social identity. This means that the sense 
of  we-ness  of  a  nation  is  under  threat  [3].  This  sense  of  we-ness  builds  on  the  cultural 
dimension of the nation. The nation therefore provides a means for political entrepreneurs 
and  career  aspirants  to  promote  their  career  advancement  by  stimulating  nationalist 
sentiments. Using these mechanisms, the idea of a nation can enfold its critical potential. If it 
can be successfully communicated that the we-ness of the nation is in danger, it may be 
perceived as a legitimate means to avert this threat by measures such as ethnic homogenisation. 
This  seems  to  be  a  particular  danger  faced  by  newly  formed  democracies  [54,  55].  The 
political level of the analysis of the mechanisms of conflict escalation can thus be traced back 
to the potential securitization of the nation by political leaders, which would not be possible 
without the cultural dimension of the nation. 
With the theory of the nation-state and securitization, the terminological framework is now 
available  to  formulate  the  hypothesis  that  ethnic  conflicts  are  an  extreme  event  of  a 
self-organised process: insofar as the nation can be constructed as an object of securitization, 
the very same mechanisms that generate social integration have the potential to generate 
conflicts and anomic structures. For this reason, the cultural and political dimension of the 
principle of the nation develops a recursive process. On the one hand, political leaders are M. Neumann 
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dependent on being accepted as a legitimate authority. The legitimacy of political power is 
dependent on being perceived as a representative of the sovereign. In a world of nation–states, 
the sovereign is the nation. On the other hand, this enables the emergence of a political 
agenda to declare the nation as being under threat. Enforcing nationalist sentiments is an 
option to  legitimate  claims  of power.  Reference to  the nation can  then enfold emotional 
power,  undermining  the  normative  basis  of  social  order.  This  enables  an  endogenous 
explanation to be made of both peace and conflict. The very principle that facilitates social 
integration also provides the components that allow for its destruction. 
ETHNO-NATIONALIST WAR AS EXTREME EVENT 
In abstract terms, the relation between legitimacy and power can be described as a recursive 
function. It is a well-known fact that recursive functions often exhibit strange behaviour. 
Thus, the hypothesis formulated above suggests viewing the breakdown of the precarious 
stability of inter-ethnic relations
10 as extreme events from the perspective of systems of self-
organised  criticality  [15].  Examples  investigated  within  the  framework  of  extreme  event 
statistics  so  far  include  earthquakes,  volcanism  [56]  and  speculative  bubbles  in  financial 
markets [57]. Although the probability of these events occurring is small, the risks involved 
are high. Extreme events cannot be treated as statistical outliers because they are not due to 
chance, but are manifestations of the complexity of the systems [58]. This implies a different 
statistical model to the traditional ballot box model of classical probability theory. In terms of 
experimental statistics of the treatment and the control group, the occurrence of extreme events 
is not a feature of any treatment. This would be an exogenous explanation. In self-organised 
systems, extreme events are not due to exogenous treatments; they are a feature of the system 
itself, i.e. the control group. 
Complex systems of self-organised criticality exhibit characteristic statistical patterns, such 
as unpredictable volatilities and power law distributions [58-60]. The power law distribution 
is the central statistical instrument to describe extreme events. For event classes that follow a 
power law distribution, it holds that the size of an event is inversely related to its frequency. 
These statistical patterns enable us to test the hypothesis that ethnic conflicts are extreme 
events of the self-organisation of the nation-state. Namely, it has to be examined whether 
such patterns can be detected in the data. Since Richardson‟s [61, 62] early investigations, it 
has been established that the distribution of the size of interstate wars follows a power law 
distribution. In [14] a framework was developed to account for the mechanisms that drive 
interstate war, leading to a power law distribution of casualties. This refers explicitly to the 
theory of self-organised criticality. [63] indicate that power law distributions can also be 
detected in civil wars. It is thus a well-known fact that, on a macro level, many aspects of 
conflicts  can  be  described  by  extreme  event  statistics.  This  provides  evidence  that  the 
ordering principle of the nation also enables an integration of large-scale social groups that is 
only of precarious stability. The recursive relation between cultural and political dynamics 
provides theoretical evidence that ethno-nationalist conflicts might well be an extreme event 
generated by the very mechanisms of this ordering principle. 
However,  the  basic  population  has  to  be  defined  in  order  to  undertake  a  statistical 
examination.  At  this  point,  it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  basic  population  is  not 
restricted to instances of conflicts. The hypothesis that social conflict and social integration 
are  due  to  the  same  sources  implies  that  the  basic  population  cannot  concentrate  on  an 
examination of conflicts. For instance, Richardson‟s well-known statistics of the size of wars 
concentrate on wars. Thus it is a statistical examination of a well-defined basic population, 
namely  wars.  However,  to  regard  only  conflicts  is  a  too  narrow  definition  of  the  basic 
population. It must also include cases of no conflict. Yet this raises the question of how to set Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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the limits of the basic population. It would obviously be incorrect to simply include all states 
in the basic population. As the example of feudal states illustrates, states do not need to be 
based on the principle of the nation. The question of defining a basic population is more 
intricate  in  the  case  of  this  hypothesis  since  we  must  determine  which  cases  count  as 
nationalist modes of social integration. Moreover, the time span poses problems: for instance, 
should Yugoslavia be counted as an instance of successful social integration (which it had 
been for 40 years), or is it a case of the reverse category? 
The problem of defining a basic population can be solved by an experimental setting, using a 
social simulation framework. First of all, this guarantees that statistical patterns are indeed 
manifestations of the system simply because they are a result of the mechanisms implemented 
in the model. Moreover, since a simulation model represents a stationary process, it allows 
the question to be integrated into the framework of quasi-ergodic processes. [64]. According 
to the quasi-ergodic hypothesis, the pathway of a trajectory comes arbitrarily close to any 
point of the phase space. Following this framework, the probability that a critical zone will be 
reached increases over time. This can be investigated by repeated runs of the same simulation 
model with different parameter settings to investigate possible developmental pathways of 
the model assumptions. The basic population is then the number of simulation runs. While 
the simulation runs are stochastically independent, they are nevertheless a result of the same 
underlying  structure.  This  guarantees  that  the  different  simulation  runs  are  different 
possibilities of the same generating conditions. 
This allows for counterfactual thought experiments with what could be denoted as possible 
histories of the model. In this case, the distribution of the time until the model runs into a 
conflict mode can be observed (cf. [65]): 
  the number of simulation runs generate a sequence X1, …., Xn with a distribution F of the 
waiting time until a conflict mode is reached. The distribution F can then be examined, 
  with M = maxX1, …., Xn  it can then be asked whether the probability p that M is smaller 
or equal to a certain threshold z holds. 
Since the simulation runs are stochastically independent, this can be calculated according to 
the theoretical conditions to generate a power law distribution. This requires that the single 
probabilities are independent. This in turn implies that the probabilities are multiplicative and 
the probability can be calculated as a power law distribution: 
  p(M ≤ z) = p(X1 ≤ z) * …* p(Xn ≤ z) = F(z)
n  (1) 
Yet the counterfactual approach does not allow for a conventional post-hoc validation of 
simulation results by comparing them with real-world data. The research question is directed 
at the variability of simulation results. However, the possible developmental pathways of the 
model cannot be compared with a set of possible histories of a real-world case. Obviously, 
only one history exists. In this case, two possible options exist: 
1) The first option is to rely on a purely theoretical model. A purely theoretical model might 
have been able to generate correct quantitative statistical patterns on an instrumental 
level [66]. The guiding principle of the model development is often simplicity, to enable a 
thorough comprehension of the model dynamics. The most prominent example of such an 
approach is the KISS principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid). However, such models do not 
aim to provide a correct description of the generating mechanisms of the target system. 
This impairs the identification of the causal processes in the target system, and therefore 
the possibility of intervention. M. Neumann 
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2) The second option is to base empirical validity not on the simulation results, but on the 
model assumptions. This suggests following the KIDS (Keep It Descriptive, Stupid) [67] 
principle as a modelling strategy. The KIDS principle recommends not using the principle 
of simplicity as a starting point for model development. Rather, models should be built on 
as much evidence of any kind as possible. The single elements provide evidence for the 
model, because they are taken from an empirical case. This enables experimentation with 
these  model  assumptions  to  rely  on  the  validity  of  the  singular  assumptions.  For  this 
purpose, the complexity of a historical situation has to be dissected into single „atomic‟ 
elements  that  can  be  evaluated with regard to their face validity [68]. These  „atomic‟ 
elements can then be the subject of experimental variation. This enables us to characterise 
developmental pathways of the real structures of the system by isolating atomic elements 
and to investigate the model behaviour in the absence or under the variation of these 
elements. The validity of counterfactual experiments can then rely on the validity of these 
atomic elements
11. 
3) These experiments can then be used to test the hypothesis: it can be investigated whether 
the  simulation  runs  with  different  parameter  combinations  in  fact  reveal  a  power  law 
distribution. This would in turn provide credibility for the hypothesis. The experimental 
question is then to compare the relative sizes of regions of stability and instability of the 
developmental pathway of the trajectory [69]. 
Such an approach requires the selection of a case study. In fact, the series of inter- and intra-state 
wars  in  former  Yugoslavia  provide  a  well-documented  example.  This  allows  for  the 
formulation of model assumptions based on detailed pieces of empirical evidence. These 
wars culminated along the borderlines of ethnicity and went hand in hand with serious war 
crimes such as ethnic homogenisation. Located in Southeast Europe, the „Balkan Wars‟ were 
fought in a region that historically belongs to the tradition of the European nation-state, the 
so-called eastern mode of nation building. Thus they provide a clear example of the case under 
scrutiny. Moreover, in the mid 1980s Yugoslavia was one of the most liberal, well-developed 
Eastern European states. Even two years before the sudden outbreak of war, it remained 
unanticipated by foreign policy analysts and the citizens themselves. In the same manner, the 
later sudden outbreak of violence in Kosovo in 2004 (i.e. a considerable time after the wars) 
also remained unanticipated. However, extreme events and unpredictable volatility are typical 
features of complex systems [58, 60]. This bears evidence of the hypothesis that it is an 
extreme event. This in turn can be explained by the hypothesis that the same mechanisms that 
in normal cases support social integration can also be detected in the outbreak of ethnic 
violence. Moreover, the ambiguous and cautious reaction of the international community at 
the  outbreak  of  the  conflicts  [70]  made  clearly  visible  the  internal  mechanisms  of  the 
escalation process up to a point of no return. For this reason, the wars in former Yugoslavia 
lend themselves for selection as a case study. 
THE MODEL ARCHITECTURE 
In the following, an overview of the model architecture will be given, cf. [17]. We will 
outline how the atomic elements are derived from the evidence of the case. It has to be 
emphasised that only the processes of the early phases of conflict escalation, and not the 
entire wars, will be considered. Later stages of wars were increasingly influenced by military 
considerations. The „military logic‟ has a momentum that differs from the question under 
consideration.  For  the  question  of  whether  and  how  the  nation-state  can  promote  social 
integration and social conflicts (i.e. social disintegration), the early phase is critical. This is 
the region of the „social phase space‟ in which the bifurcation to peace or conflict can be 
found by mobilising the population to engage in war and even to actively commit war crimes. Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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GENERAL DESIGN 
To  represent  the  interaction  between  the  cultural  and  the  political  dynamics,  the  model 
consists of two types of agents: the political élite and the local population. Politicians are 
modelled as more complex actors. Local citizens, modelled as simpler actors, exist in greater 
numbers. However, the two types of actor are structurally coupled. This reflects the recursive 
feedback  between  the  two  kinds  of  dynamics.  On  the  one  hand,  politicians‟  careers  are 
dependent on mass support; on the other hand, the mobilisation of mass support stimulates 
the mobilisation of individual identities. Thus the driving forces of the model are political 
career aspirations at the level of the political élite and the mobilisation of ethnic identities at 
the  level  of  the  local  population.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  career  of,  for  instance, 
Milosevic, was promoted by his ability to stimulate mass demonstrations [21], encouraging a 
political climate for conflict escalation. 
 
Figure 1. Relation of the two agent types of the model. 
ACTOR MODELS 
The aim to promote a personal political career can be described as a rational motivation. On 
the  other  hand,  ethnographic  accounts  [71]  have  described  the  involvement  of  the  local 
population in war  crimes  as emotionally driven.  To represent the different motivation of 
citizens and politicians, the two agent classes are modelled using different actor models.  
Politicians can be represented by the standard model of the rational actor model. Here the 
theory of subjective expected utilities (SEU), originally developed by [72] can be utilised. 
The goal of these agents is to make career advancements. However, these career aspirants are 
in competition with one another. Unsuccessful politicians are replaced by new up-and-coming 
politicians. In the first instance, these imitate the successful politicians. The criterion of the 
rivalry is their popularity within the population. Thus, politicians are opportunists who aim to 
maximise their support. However, the strategic evaluation is undertaken in three dimensions: 
  Political atmosphere: this is measured by support for a certain type of speech. 
  Credibility: this is a function of a politician‟s personal history. A politician is no longer 
credible if he or she changes the political agenda too frequently. 
  Exclusiveness: an increasing number of politicians who decide to hold a certain type of 
speech  decrease the chances  of an individual politician  to be  recognised  as the prime 
representative of this agenda. It may be advantageous to opt for a type of agenda with 
fewer competitors, even if there is less overall support. M. Neumann 
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The emotional motivation of the population can be represented following the theory of the 
„identity preserver‟, popularised by [73]. This actor model can be illustrated by a scale with 
two containers representing two different value orientations (Fig. 2) [74]. Civil values can roughly 
be described as an orientation on the idea of Yugoslavism („unity and brotherhood‟) [75]. 
However, at the time of conflict escalation, issues of political and economic reforms were an 
urgent topic of public debate. This is also covered by the heading „civil values‟. On the other 
hand, the value of ethnic identity represents the pride of the nation and the meaningfulness 
ascribed to this issue. Opinion polls indicate that roughly 10 % to 15 % of the population 
regarded this as a prime issue [2]. In principle, however, individuals possess both types of 
value orientation. However, the strength of the respective value orientation may differ. This is 
represented by the amount to which each container is filled, as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2. Actor model of civilians. 
SCHEDULING 
The overview in Fig. 3 highlights the fact that the model scheduling consists of two phases: a 
state of social order and an anomic state. In principle, the recursive feedback loop between 
politicians and citizens indicated by the two upward and downward bars may be maintained 
in  the  state  of  social  order.  This  is  a  rather  general  mechanism,  not  specific  to  the 
Yugoslavian case. However, under certain circumstances (in which, again, both levels of 
politicians and citizens are involved) the model may enter the anomic state. The concrete 
mechanisms for the transition into the anomic state are specific for the Yugoslavian case. 
Following  the  KIDS  principle,  they  are  derived  from  the  circumstances  of  the  first time 
ethnic homogenisations took place in the conflict surrounding Krajina Serbs, described in 
Section 2. In the following, the individual steps will be explained in more detail. 
1
st step: political mobilization 
Politicians hold speeches to organise support. These speeches can appeal to either civil values 
or the national identity of the respective nation. Six different nations existed in Yugoslavia. In 
the  first  round  the  type  of  speech  is  selected  randomly.  People  all  over  simulated 
„Yugoslavia‟ are able to hear the speeches. One example would be that the speeches are 
broadcast  on  television  news.  Viewers  can  evaluate  the  speeches  according  to  their  own 
political conviction, modelled in the actor model described above. Initially, the convictions Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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Figure 3. Overview of the Scheduling. 
are randomly distributed. The evaluation is undertaken by calculating the distance of the type 
of speech from their conviction. 
However, people are not isolated, but live in neighbourhoods and have networks of friends. 
People discuss their evaluation of the speeches in these networks. This represents the idea that 
the success of political campaigns becomes the topic of public debate, causing people to decide 
whether or not to support the speeches. Support is signalled by participating in demonstrations 
in favour of the politician. The decision can be based on two grounds: first, individuals can 
strongly support the speech, regardless of their friends‟ opinions. This is the case when the 
distance between their conviction and the speech is rather low. In this case, they participate in 
the demonstration alone. Second, after the discussion people can decide to join a demonstration 
as part of a group. In this case, the  majority of the group moderately favours the speech, i.e. the 
average distance is considerable, but on the positive axis. Participating in these demonstrations 
enforces value preferences. This represents the fact that, in particular at the beginning of the 
conflicts, Yugoslavia faced a series of huge mass demonstrations. A prime example to illustrate 
this basic idea is Milosevic‟s well-known speech in Kosovo, in which he addressed the Serbs 
living in this region, stating that nobody should beat them. This speech, delivered at a mass 
demonstration, was broadcast on the news, and stimulated reactions all over Yugoslavia. The 
last point is important insofar as a speech does not only have a regional effect. It enabled 
Milosevic to become well known throughout Yugoslavia. It was the take-off of his career. 
However, while he became popular among a certain subpopulation of the Serbian people, he 
became the subject of fear and anger in the other Yugoslavian nations. 
2
nd step: political conflicts – securitization 
In the second round, politicians evaluate which type of speech they should hold. Speeches are 
no  longer  selected  randomly.  This  reflects  the  opportunism  observed  in  the  number  of M. Neumann 
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politicians  who  changed  from  a  communist  to  a  nationalist  agenda.  It  is  crucial  for  the 
particular case of Yugoslavia that the agenda of politicians is recognisable across the Federal 
Republic. Moreover, people of different nationalities lived in different republics. Thus, an 
appeal to a certain type of nationalism is recognisable also by people living outside that 
particular republic. For instance, Milosevic‟s appeal to Serbian nationalism („nobody should 
beat you‟) was recognised by people of all nationalities in all of the republics, and therefore 
also by Serbs resident outside Serbia. This had the effect that the Serbian politician Milosevic 
was regarded as their representative by a group of people living outside Serbia, namely the 
„Krajina Serbs‟ living in Croatia. This was a cause of political conflict. To abstract from this 
particular case, in the model an alarm function for the rise of a political conflict is activated if 
a nationalist politician gains support outside the territory of his or her home republic (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4. Generation of political conflicts. 
3rd step: conditions for violence 
Now the conditions for violent conflict escalation are given. Three conditions can be derived 
from the empirical case: 
  Opportunities: These are given by political conflicts, providing an atmosphere in which, 
for instance, violence may no longer be subject to criminal prosecution. 
  Motivation: Nevertheless, individuals must become motivated to undertake violence. It is 
striking that ethnic violence was barely undertaken by individuals. Instead, paramilitary 
militia played a crucial role. However, at least at the onset of the conflicts, these were 
rather  locally  organised  [76].  While  not  only  the  direct  neighbours  of  the  particular 
villages were involved, they were nevertheless regional organisations that did not have the 
logistics required to be represented across Yugoslavia. This is modelled as networks of 
highly radicalised nationalists. Thus, the degree of mobilisation of ethnic identity has to be 
very  high,  while  the  degree  of  civil  values  has  to  be  very  low.  This  represents  the 
emotional motivation of civilians involved in the war
12. Such individuals have to become 
connected to jointly form a militia. They search for other agents with such a characteristic. 
However, the search radius is limited, and they act within the limits of their search radius. Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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  Complicity: It is curious that a further condition was a constant characteristic of the ethnic 
homogenisations in former Yugoslavia, namely, a certain degree of complicity by the local 
population  [19,  76].  Again  and  again,  the  militia  planning  to  attack  a  certain  village 
warned  the  inhabitants  of  their  „own‟  nationality.  These  could  have  warned  their 
neighbours of different nationality, but they chose not to. They often even participated in 
the looting that took place after the attack. This behaviour pattern is modelled as an agent 
with an eventually only modest degree of ethnic mobilisation, but also only a modest 
degree of mobilisation of civil values. 
4th step: anomic system state 
If these conditions are fulfilled, the model reaches the anomic state. The militia undertake 
ethnic homogenisations within its local neighbourhood, including murder and displacement. 
Survivors  flee  in  the  direction  of  the  territory  of  their  ethnicity.  The  refugee  population 
provides a source of sometimes strongly radicalised nationalists; if these find collaborators, 
they accompany a militia. However, it has to be emphasised that the specific actions and 
tactics of certain militia are not the focus of this investigation. Instead, the guiding question is 
whether and how such an anomic system state can be reached in the first place. 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Although the wars in former Yugoslavia have been studied extensively, how the extreme 
outbreak  of  violence  was  possible  remains  a  controversial  question.  The  manipulation 
hypothesis  claims  it  has  to  be  traced  back  to  Machiavellian  politics.  This  builds  on  the 
evidence that ethnic relations were described as unproblematic, even at the time of already 
emerging political conflicts, and the „national question‟ was perceived as urgent by only a 
small minority. In fact, politicians used nationalist rhetoric as a device to gain access to 
power. On the other hand, the ancient hatred hypothesis builds on the evidence that violence 
was  undertaken  deliberately  by  civilians.  This  is  then  traced  back  to  the  numerous  wars 
between the Yugoslavian nations stored in the collective memory. 
Explanations of these wars typically introduce certain factors that differ from the situation of 
peace. For instance, these may be economic shocks or the appearance of certain politicians. 
This can be characterised as an exogenous explanation. However, civilisations are continuously 
faced with the problem of integrating large-scale social groups. The nation-state has established 
an ordering principle that is an essential element to solve this problem. Yet, it can be suspected 
that such an ordering principle will tend towards a stable equilibrium. Evidence from interstate 
wars indicate that international relations are a system of self-organised criticality. A theoretical 
examination of  how the organising  principle  of the  nation  may generate social integration 
suggests that this ordering principle also develops a system of self-organised criticality. This 
implies that social order may revert to an anomic state. This was observed, for instance, in 
former  Yugoslavia.  This  is  an  endogenous  explanation  of  ethno-nationalist  violence,  as  a 
manifestation of the complexity of the system. This can be tested by the simulation framework 
developed here: politicians indeed have the capacity to provoke nationalist (as well as civil) 
sentiment. This reflects the intuition of the manipulation hypothesis. However, they are not an 
exogenous  „shock‟,  but  are  generated  endogenously  in  the  model.  People  select  their 
politicians. Their political agenda is not arbitrary but – at least indirectly – a reflection of the 
political atmosphere amongst the population. Thus, if nationalist extremists come to power, this 
is not arbitrary. This reflects the intuition of the culturalist explanations. However, in contrast to 
the ancient hatred hypothesis, the political atmosphere is not simply inevitably given since 
ancient times, but evolves endogenously in the model. People are not condemned to violence. 
However, the recursive feedback relation can generate only precarious stability. M. Neumann 
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The fact that the Yugoslavian case is well documented suggests its use as proof of the concept. 
However, the idea of the nation is of a much wider scope. It is misleading to presume that such 
violence  may  only  happen  on  the  Balkans.  Conflicts  involving  an  ethnic  dimension  are 
observed all over the world. Presumably, not all of these conflicts involve a political dimension 
comparable to this case. [6, 77] provides detailed evidence of instances that may be explained 
purely  on  a  cultural  level.  However,  a  number  of  these  conflicts  do  involve  a  political 
dimension. It can be presumed that these cases exhibit a recursive feedback relation between 
cultural and political dynamics, as described here. For instance, the number of partly „frozen‟ 
ethno-nationalist conflicts in the post-Soviet area may well be driven by comparable dynamics. 
While the specific mechanisms that drive the model from the state of social order into an 
anomic state are derived from detailed evidence from the empirical case, the mechanisms that 
generate the feedback loop between the political and cultural level are rather general (Fig. 3). 
For instance, the emergence of nationalist political parties can be observed across the European 
Union.  This  may  well  be  an  instance  of  such  a  feedback  loop.  While  the  details  of  the 
mechanisms of the transition to the anomic state cannot be generalised to this case, its possibility 
may provide awareness of the fragility of stability. There may then be hope that the study of the 
past violence in Yugoslavia will help to prevent future disasters. A simulation study enables us 
to  detect  escalation  paths  and  stable  pathways,  and  eventually  early  warning  signals.  A 
systemic view shows at least that we humans are not condemned to violence. At first sight, this 
might be counterintuitive. However, while self-organised criticality suggests that retaining civil 
life is critical, the criticality also shows that it is open to the freedom of human will. 
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REMARKS 
1A minor example is that the republics that left the Yugoslavian Federation were armed to a 
large extent by labour migrants [21]. 
2In  the  economic  literature,  this  is  typically  referred  to  as  „shocks‟.  For  a  discussion  of 
endogenous  versus  exogenous  origins  of  economic  crises,  compare  [78].  However,  an 
endogenous  explanation  by  no  means  implies  rejecting  the  explanations  identified  in  the 
literature. On the contrary, it needs to be explained how they can be integrated by showing 
how they are generated by the operational principles of the nation-state. 
3Milosevic went on to win three consecutive elections in Serbia. 
4However, the first victims of the war were found in Belgrade: the Serbian media reported 
untruthfully that peaceful, helpless Serbs had been murdered by Croats. When the lie was 
exposed, mass demonstrations were held in protest of Milosevic. In the course of the conflict, 
a policeman and a demonstrator died. 
5For instance, while the most divergent economic conditions were between Slovenia and the 
Kosovo region, the most extreme violence took place within the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
6Further conditions have been identified in geographic circumstances [5]. Yet, recourse to 
constant (and indeed: endogenous) geographical factors cannot explain peace, i.e. why – in 
this case – Yugoslavia was a functioning state for 40 years. 
7Most prominently advocated by [79]. 
8Obviously not in other dimensions: most of all, the nation is a secular institution and thus 
cannot provide eternal salvation [34]. Modelling the dynamics of securizitating national identities 
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9Within the framework of theories of ethnic conflicts, this account is usually characterised as 
belonging to the constructivist camp. However, it also has an instrumentalist aspect, as it 
emphasises  –  eventually  instrumentalist  –  political  action.  The  most  prominent  antithetic 
account is the primordialist theory of [77]. 
10So far, the theory of extreme events has not been applied to mass-mobilization in times 
structural ruptures  of social  structure.  Empirical  research  suggests  that it  is an  extreme 
event [80, 81]. However, so far it has not been inquired empirically whether the time scales 
of the occurrence of such events can be modelled by extreme event statistics. 
11Such an experimental approach is closely related to Ragin‟s re-evaluation of social inquiry [82] 
and was already suggested by Max Weber‟s study of historical causality [68]. 
12In fact, a number of criminals, such as the „Arkan tigers‟ were actually also involved in war 
crimes. Criminal motivation is not represented here. 
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